In this paper, a new algorithm to solve the discrete logarithm problem is presented which is similar to the usual baby-step giant-step algorithm. Our algorithm exploits the order of the discrete logarithm in the multiplicative group of a finite field. Using randomization with parallelized collision search, our algorithm indicates some weakness in NIST curves over prime fields which are considered to be the most conservative and safest curves among all NIST curves.
Introduction
It is well-known that computationally hard number theoretic problems are used as primitives in public-key cryptography. On that basis, public-key cryptography can be divided into two categories. One uses the hardness of factorizing large integer as the building blocks to construct public-key protocols and the other is based on the computational difficulty of solving the discrete logarithm problem. In this paper, we are interested in the latter.
Let G be a cyclic group of prime order p and generated by P which is written additive. Given an element Q = xP ∈ G, the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) in G is to compute the integer x. This integer x is called the discrete logarithm of Q with the base P . There are generic algorithms such as the baby-step giant-step algorithm [3] which solves DLP in any group G.
In this paper, we develop and study a different version of the baby-step giantstep algorithm. The novelty of our approach comes from the implicit representation using F × p as auxiliary group. Our approach leads to a way to reduce the discrete logarithm problem to a problem in F × p . The advantage of this approach is, F × p has many subgroups and one can exploit the rich and well understood subgroup structure of F × p .
In Theorem 1 we develop an algorithm that solves the discrete logarithm problem using implicit representation. Two things come out of this theorem:
A If the secret key x belongs to some small subgroup of F × p , there can be an efficient attack on the DLP. B If somehow it is known to an attacker that the secret key is in some subgroup H of F × p , that information can be used to develop a better attack.
The question remains, what happens if no information about the secret x is known. We develop a probabilistic algorithm (Theorem 2) to expand our attack. To understand this probabilistic attack properly, we study it on the curve P-256. This is an NIST recommended curve over a prime field and is considered secure. Our study, which we present in details in Section 3 indicates some weakness in this curve.
Main Work
Let G be a cyclic group of prime order p and generated by P which is written additive. For y ∈ F p , yP ∈ G is called the implicit representation of y ∈ F p (with respect to G and P ). The following lemma comes from the idea of implicit representation of a finite field, proposed by Maurer and Wolf [5] . Proof. Assume that a = b (mod p), then a = tp + b for some integer t. Then aP = tpP + bP = bP . Conversely, assume that aP = bP , then (a − b)P = 0 in G and this means p|(a − b) which implies that a = b (mod p).
The usefulness of this lemma is to be able to decide on the equality in F × p by looking at the equality in G. The following algorithm to solve the discrete logarithm problem uses the order of the discrete logarithm in the multiplicative group of a finite field. This algorithm is different from the baby-step giant-step [3] as it uses the implicit representation with multiplicative group of a finite field as auxiliary group. Theorem 1. Let G be an additive cyclic group generated by P and order of P is a prime p. Let Q = xP be another given element of G(x is unknown). Proof. Since H is a subgroup of the cyclic group F × p , we assume that it is generated by some element ζ. If the generator of H is not given to us, we can compute it using a generator of F × and d. The proof of whether x belongs to H or not follows from the well-known baby-step giant-step algorithm [3, Proposition 2.22] to compute the discrete logarithm.
Let n be the smallest integer greater than √ d. Then x ∈ H if and only if there exists an integer k with 0 ≤ k ≤ d such that x = ζ k (mod p). Note that any integer k between 0 and d can be written as k = an − b for unique integers a, b with 0 ≤ a, b ≤ n, by division algorithm. Therefore, x ∈ H if and only if there exist two integers a, b with 0 ≤ a, b ≤ n such that x = ζ an−b (mod p), or equivalently ζ b x = ζ na (mod p). Using the lemma above, we see that x ∈ H if and only if there exist two integers a, b with 0 ≤ a, b ≤ n such that
Then we generate elements of the form (ζ n ) a P for each integer a in [0, n] and try to find a collision with the earlier list. When there is a collision, i.e.,
So, we use the integers a and b to compute ζ an−b (mod p) which is nothing but the discrete logarithm x. Since the two lists require computation of at most 2n exponentiations, the worst case time complexity of the algorithm to check whether or not x ∈ H, as well as to compute Suppose that p−1 has large enough(but a lot smaller than p−1) divisor d and H is the unique subgroup of F × p of order d. A drawback of the deterministic algorithm given in Theorem 1 is that it might fail to solve DLP because the probability of x belonging to H is very small. One way to increase the probability is to increase the size of d, if such d exists. Clearly, this is not a desirable solution because the computational cost depends on the size of the subgroup.
The above algorithm can be parallelized which helps us overcome this obstacle by increasing the probability. We have randomized the above algorithm where the random inputs will be running on parallel processes or threads. This parallelization along with collision algorithm (based on birthday paradox) [3, Theorem 5 .38] yields a randomized probabilistic algorithm which can solve DLP with a given probability. Collision Theorem: An urn contains N balls, of which n balls are red and N − n are blue. One randomly selects a ball from the urn, replaces it in the urn, randomly selects a second ball, replaces it, and so on. He does this until he has looked at a total number of m balls. Then, the probability that he selects at least one red ball is Pr(at least one red ball)
Theorem 2. Let G be an additive cyclic group generated by P and the order of P is a prime p. Let Q = xP be another given element of G(x is unknown). Proof. The main idea is to run the algorithm in Theorem 1 on each of m threads as follows. We randomly selects m elements y 1 , y 2 , .., y m in F × p and compute corresponding m elements Q 1 = y 1 Q = (y 1 x)P ,...,Q m = y m Q = (y m x)P of G. Now, we run the above algorithm on each of m parallel threads, with element Q i = (y i x)P running on i th thread. Let z i = y i x (mod p) for i = 1, .., m. If z i ∈ H for some i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m; then the algorithm on that thread returns z i . Once we have z i for some i, we compute z i · y i −1 (mod p) which is nothing but the discrete logarithm x.
The collision theorem above tells us about the probability of at least one z i belonging to H for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. In present case, F × p with p − 1 elements is the urn, so N = p − 1. The elements of H are red balls, so n = d. Since we are randomly selecting m elements y 1 , .., y m from F × p , it implies that z 1 , z 2 , .., z m also are random elements of F × p . Therefore, probability that at least one of z i would belong to H is at least 1 − e −dm p−1 , by the collision theorem. In other words, with probability at least 1−e [6] as well as most of SEC2 curves [7] . This gives us precise estimates about the number of group operations and threads needed to solve DLP with a given probability. We illustrate this by an example in the next section. 
Remark 2. It follows from Theorem 2 that if there exist divisors d of p − 1 of suitable sizes, then DLP can be solved in time much less than the square root of the group size but with a probability which increases with the number of threads used. A practical importance of Theorem 2 lies in the fact that such divisors of p − 1 do exist for all NIST curves

Security analysis of NIST curve P-256
As discussed earlier, our probabilistic algorithm is applicable to NIST curves. In this section, we will demonstrate the implication of our algorithm on NIST curves. We will do that only on the NIST curve P-256 but similar conclusions hold for other four NIST curves over prime field as well, see appendix. The NIST curve P-256 is defined over the prime field F q and the order of P-256 is a prime p given below.
Since p − 1 factors into many relatively small integers, we have the following divisors of p − 1 of various sizes. For above sizes of subgroups and various number of threads m, the following tables give the probability to solve DLP. The second column of the Table 1 shows the probabilities when the subgroup size is d 1 ≈ 2 201.73 bits. For example, if we have m = 2 54 parallel threads, then our algorithm would solve DLP in 2 101.86 steps with probability 0.56458 which is the intersection of the fifth row(corresponding to m = 2 54 ) and the second column(corresponding to d 1 ≈ 2 201.73 ). Other en- Table 3 tries(probabilities) of the tables can be understood similarly.
If we go across a row in the tables, we see the probabilities getting increased with the size of subgroup d. If we move along a column, probabilities increase with the number (m) of parallel threads. Table 1 also exhibits the trade-off between d and m for equal probability. For equal probability, highlighted diagonally in the second and third column, we see that increasing the subgroup size by 1-bit(d 1 and d 2 differ by 1-bit) results in a decrease of 1-bit in the number of parallel threads m. As an example, to achieve the probability 0.56458, the subgroup of order d 1 requires 2 54 parallel threads while the subgroup of order d 2 requires 2 53 .
From Table 3 , we can see that DLP on the curve P-256 can be solved in 2 110.25 (with a significant reduction from 2 128 ) steps with probability greater than 0.5, while using 2 35 parallel threads. This indicates a weakness of NIST curve P-256 if one assumes that 2 35 parallel threads are within the reach of modern distributed computing. Similar conclusions can be drawn for other NIST curves P-192, P-224, P-384 and P-521 see appendix.
Moreover, one observes that for most of the curves in SEC2(Version 2) [7] which also include all other ten NIST curves [6] over binary field, p − 1 factors into small divisors. Therefore, our algorithm for solving DLP on those curves in SEC2 [7] can similarly be studied.
Conclusion
In this paper we presented a novel idea of using the implicit representation with F × p as auxiliary group to solve the discrete logarithm problem in a group G of prime order p. We modified the most common generic algorithm, the baby-step giantstep algorithm for this purpose and studied it further for NIST curves over prime fields. This algorithm that we developed brings to the spotlight the structure of the auxiliary group for the security of the discrete logarithm problem in G. This aspect is probably reported for the first time.
